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In daily life, we constantly have to switch between different 
thoughts and actions in response to changing task demands 
and internal needs. For example, while writing a paper with its 
deadline approaching, you might get distracted by incoming 
e-mails or feelings of hunger. You can either switch actions 
(answer the e-mails or grab some food) and then turn back to 
your writing task, or you can try to ignore the distraction and 
continue with the ongoing task. Whether you switch or stay on 
task, cognitive control can support either decision by shielding 
against the distraction or by helping to switch back and forth 
between tasks.
In this context, the task-switching paradigm has become a 
popular tool to study such processes of cognitive control (see 
Kiesel et al., 2010; Vandierendonck, Liefooghe, & Verbrug-
gen, 2010, for recent reviews). In this paradigm, participants 
have to switch between two or more simple cognitive tasks 
(e.g., a letter- and a digit-categorization task). One robust find-
ing is that performance, in terms of reaction times and error 
rates, is better on task repetitions (e.g., two letter tasks in 
a row) than on task switches (e.g., a letter-categorization task 
after a digit-categorization task). These switch costs (i.e., 
decreased performance resulting from switching between 
tasks) have long been taken as a direct measure for the amount 
of cognitive control needed to flexibly switch between cogni-
tive operations.1 In this article, I review recent research from 
our lab showing that when it comes to task switching, the 
application of a task rule is just as indicative of the involve-
ment of cognitive control as is the process of switching 
per se.
Why Task Rules Instead of Stimulus-
Response Rules?
When I first learned about the task-switching paradigm 15 
years ago, I already wondered why participants actually 
switched between tasks instead of simply learning the indi-
vidual stimulus-response (SR) rules by heart. This is surpris-
ing, especially given that most studies use only a small set of 
four to eight stimuli. Figure 1 illustrates this idea by showing 
two alternative task representations for eight different stimuli, 
either in the form of individual SR rules (left) or in the form of 
two task rules (right). From this, it should also be apparent that 
task rules differ from SR rules, in that task rules define a com-
mon response-discriminating stimulus feature whereas SR 
rules define the mapping between an entire stimulus and a 
response.
If participants used SR rules instead of task rules, no switch 
costs should occur because there are no task rules that could be 
switched in the first place. But apparently—and as indicated by 
robust finding of switch costs even with only four different 
stimuli—participants do switch. One straightforward reason for 
this could be that participants simply do what they are asked to 
do by the instructions, which typically tell participants to 
respond to the stimuli according to a given categorization rule. 
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Abstract
Cognitive control enables humans to flexibly switch between different thoughts and actions. An important prerequisite for 
this cognitive flexibility is the human ability to form and apply general task rules. In this article, I review research investigating 
the functional role of task rules, with an emphasis on two main findings. First, the shielding function of task rules helps guide 
attention toward task-related information, thereby reducing possible distraction by irrelevant information. Second, this task 
shielding has to be relaxed when a task rule changes, thereby making the cognitive system more vulnerable to the intrusion 
of distracting information. Implications for developmental psychology and higher-level cognition are discussed.
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An alternative and less obvious answer to the question of why 
participants use these rules is that they cannot refrain from 
doing so once they become aware of the rules, either through 
instruction or because stimuli are mapped to responses accord-
ing to a natural category (as in the example in Fig. 1).
To test this latter assumption, we created a paradigm in 
which the instructions suggested that participants use a task 
representation based on single SR-rules (Dreisbach, Goschke, 
& Haider, 2006, 2007): Eight different word stimuli were 
introduced in pairs (the two stimuli in each pair were mapped 
to the left or the right response, respectively) so that partici-
pants could practice applying the SR rules before the next pair 
was introduced. Critically, four words were always printed in 
red and the other four were always printed in green. One group 
of participants simply learned the SR rules through practice, 
whereas another group of participants was additionally 
informed about two underlying task rules but was not explic-
itly asked to use them: For red-colored words, the underlying 
rule was “animal vs. not an animal”; for green-colored words, 
the underlying rule was “first letter a consonant vs. first letter 
a vowel.” It follows that color was a completely irrelevant 
stimulus feature in the SR group but informative in the task-
rule group. It turned out that the participants in the former 
group (without information about the underlying task rules) 
outperformed participants who had been given the task-rule 
information in every respect: They were generally faster and 
did not show any switch costs (between-color switches). In 
contrast, participants who were aware of the task rules showed 
switch costs from the very beginning, even at a stage where 
only four or six different words occurred. Moreover, when 
another group of participants was casually informed about the 
task rules after they had already learned and applied the eight 
SR rules without exhibiting switch costs, switch costs occurred 
immediately after this information was given! These data 
strongly suggest that task rules are extremely persistent in 
nature: Once task rules are known, participants cannot help 
but apply them (see also Mayr & Bryck, 2005). This finding is 
even more surprising because we consistently used univalent 
stimuli that were unequivocally mapped to one response, mak-
ing the actual application of a given task rule even less 
necessary.
Gilbert and Shallice (2002), who developed a neural- 
network model of task switching, also emphasized the impor-
tance of differentiating between stimulus-specific vs. task-
specific processes: “The distinction between individual S-R 
mappings and task sets, composed of all of the individual S-R 
mappings which are required to carry out an experimental 
task, is crucial” (p. 298). In their model, however, Gilbert and 
Shallice used Stroop color words as stimuli and implemented 
switching between color-naming and word-reading tasks. 
Because with such bivalent stimuli, each stimulus can be used 
for both of the tasks, stimulus-specific and task-specific pro-
cesses are necessarily confounded. It might be interesting to 
determine how the model behaves using representations based 
on SR rules versus representations based on task rules with 
univalent stimuli. The data and paradigm presented so far 
might thus provide a sound empirical basis for further model 
testing.
The Functional Role of Task Rules
Participants’ unexpectedly good performance under SR condi-
tions raises the question of what functional role task rules 
might play. Of course, one obvious advantage of task rules 
over SR rules is that they can be applied to a theoretically infi-
nite number of stimuli, whereas SR rules have to be learned 
individually.2 This still does not explain why task rules are so 
persistent in nature. However, it is possible that comparing 
performance using SR rules with performance using two task 
rules makes it hard to detect their functional value. After all, 
the task-switching paradigm might overemphasize the costs of 
task rules and obscure their benefits when the task rule does 
not change constantly.
Therefore, in a series of additional experiments, we com-
pared performance using SR rules with performance using just 
one task -rule (Dreisbach & Haider, 2008, 2009). These stud-
ies consistently yielded evidence that task rules facilitate 
shielding against irrelevant information. The first study 
(Dreisbach & Haider, 2008) showed that an irrelevant stimulus 
feature (color) interacted with participants’ responses in the 
SR group, but not in the group that used a task rule. The sec-
ond study (Dreisbach & Haider, 2009) showed that the task 
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Fig. 1. Alternative task representations in form of stimulus-response (SR) rules or two task rules. 
L = left response; R = right response.
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rule prevented response interference from spatial distracters 
(the target words were presented on spatially oriented pictures 
of animals) that were unrelated to the task rules. The same dis-
tracters, however, led to significant response interference in the 
SR condition. Interestingly, the participants in the SR group, 
who reported in a postexperimental interview that they had 
formed their own task rule (e.g., “things I like” vs. “things I 
don’t like”), showed the same shielding effects as the instructed 
task-rule group did. Taken together, the data from these latter 
studies suggest that task rules guide attention toward the 
response-discriminative stimulus features that are part of the 
task representation, thereby helping participants to ignore any 
information that is not part of the task representation. Individ-
ual SR rules, in contrast, do not indicate which feature of a 
given stimulus is important, making the system more suscepti-
ble to distraction by extraneous stimulus features.
With this newly gained insight about the shielding function 
of task rules, we went back to the investigation of task switch-
ing (Dreisbach & Wenke, 2011). We reasoned that during task 
switching, task shielding should temporarily be relaxed 
because otherwise, the system would perseverate in using the 
currently active task rule. As predicted, task shielding occurred 
on task repetitions (as indicated by a lack of interference by 
an irrelevant stimulus feature) but not on task switches 
(Dreisbach & Wenke, 2011). From this perspective, the switch 
costs in the task-switching paradigm can be explained at least 
in part by the temporary relaxation of task shielding. That is, 
although this relaxation enables task switching (which might 
otherwise not be possible), it concurrently makes the cognitive 
system more vulnerable to the intrusion of any information 
that is not part of the currently activated task rule, thereby 
incurring switch costs.
Processes Underlying Task Shielding
But what is the cognitive process underlying the specific 
shielding mechanism? Is it the inhibition of irrelevant infor-
mation, the activation of relevant information, or a mixture of 
both? So far, most evidence indicates that shielding enhances 
the processing of the response-discriminative stimulus fea-
tures defined by the task rule, thereby reducing the influence 
of information that is unrelated to the task rule but increasing 
the influence of related (but possibly irrelevant) information 
(Dreisbach & Haider, 2009; Reisenauer & Dreisbach, 2012). 
Note that such a mechanism is not possible when task perfor-
mance is based on SR rules, because the SR-rule instructions 
do not indicate which feature of a given stimulus is response 
discriminative.
In principle, a shielding mechanism based on enhanced 
processing of task-related information would seem to be 
highly adaptive because—at least outside the lab—task-
related information more often than not is also task-relevant 
information. Moreover, such a shielding mechanism might 
also circumvent the not-so-trivial problem of selecting 
between relevant and irrelevant information by directing 
attention to any response-discriminative stimulus feature 
that matches the currently active task rule (Reisenauer & 
Dreisbach, 2012). The elegance of this assumption lies in its 
independency of an omniscient homunculus that miraculously 
knows what is relevant and what is not relevant. This idea also 
fits nicely with the well-established contingent-capture hypoth-
esis from the literature on attention (e.g., Folk, Remington, 
& Johnston, 1992), according to which attentional selection 
is driven by perceptual goals (equivalent to the response- 
discriminative features of task rules), maybe even suggesting 
a general selection mechanism of the attentional and cogni-
tive-control system. Tables 1 and 2 contrast the main findings 
concerning SR rules and task rules that I have reviewed 
so far.
Implications for Developmental Psychology 
and Higher-Level Cognition
Research on the functional role of task rules presented here is 
closely related to that of other psychological disciplines. In 
developmental psychology, for example, it is well documented 
that until the age of 3, children have problems switching 
between tasks, a deficit that might be due to the specific task 
representations that children adopt. Recently, it was shown 
that 3-year-old children who used abstract task rules were 
actually better able to switch than were those who used 
stimulus-specific SR rules, who showed deficits. The chil-
dren’s use of either abstract or stimulus-specific task represen-
tations was inferred from their ability or inability, respectively, 
to apply a given task rule to new stimuli (Kharitonova, Chien, 
Table 1. Comparison of Performance Under Different Task 
Representations: Two Task Rules Versus Several SR Rules
       Two Task Rules     Several SR Rules
Slowly learned, persistent Fast and easy to learn
Switch costs No switch costs
Transfer costs No transfer costs
Table 2. Comparison of Performance Under Different Task 
Representations: One Task Rule / Task Repetitions Versus Several SR 
Rules
One Task Rule / Task Repetitions           Several SR Rules
Task shielding No shielding
No binding of irrelevant stimulus 
feature and response
Binding of irrelevant stimulus 
feature and response
Response interference by task-
rule-related distracters that 
never occurred as targets; No 
response interference by unre-
lated spatial distracters
Response interference by  
unrelated spatial distracters
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Colunga, & Munakata, 2009). On a neuronal basis, this devel-
opment of rule use from specific SR rules to more abstract 
task rules is reflected in the structural and functional special-
ization of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) during early life: 
Although univalent SR rules seem to rely on the earlier- 
maturing ventrolateral PFC, higher-order task rules rely pri-
marily on the later-maturing dorsolateral and rostrolateral PFC 
(cf. Bunge & Zelazo, 2006; see also Badre, 2008).
But even though the formation and use of task rules as such 
can be seen as indicative of higher-level cognition,3 it is strik-
ing how easily adults form their own task rules. In fact, it was 
always a challenge to create task rules that would not be 
detected by the participants in the SR condition, even though 
these participants were never informed that there was an 
underlying task rule—resulting in rules like “things that move” 
(e.g., swing, tractor, arm, koala) versus “things that do not 
move” (e.g., desk, cheese, cactus, phone). Overall, an esti-
mated 10% of the participants still reported that they had 
formed their own individual task rule that allowed them to cat-
egorize stimuli mapped to the left and the right response, 
respectively. Presenting all stimuli at once (e.g., Dreisbach & 
Haider, 2009, Experiment 2) actually increased this percent-
age to over 50% (18 out of 34 participants). On the other hand, 
even though the task rules in our experiments were unusual 
and arbitrary, they obviously still were considered helpful. 
This is in line with the ideas of Barsalou (1983), who was one 
of the first to point out the importance of such ad hoc catego-
ries (e.g., “things you need for a day on the beach”) for goal 
achievement. Further support for this claim has come from a 
recent study by Chrysikou (2006), which provided the first 
empirical evidence that training participants to form such ad 
hoc categories significantly improves their performance in an 
unrelated insight-problem-solving task.
Conclusion
In sum, task rules are easily formed and hard to get rid of. The 
shielding function of task rules helps to guide attention and 
action by enhancing the processing of any information that fits 
into the currently active task rule. Even though switching 
between task rules comes at a cost, because it requires that task 
shielding be relaxed, the consequential susceptibility to new 
information unrelated to the abandoned task may eventually 
open the mind and promote flexible thinking.
Recommended Reading
Dreisbach, G., Goschke, T., & Haider, H. (2007). (See References). 
Provides the first demonstration of a direct comparison between 
performance based on SR rules vs. task rules.
Dreisbach, G., & Wenke, D. (2011). (See References). Presents two 
experiments showing that the shielding mechanism is present on 
task repetitions but relaxed on task switches.
Kiesel, A., Steinhauser, M., Wendt, M., Falkenstein, M., Jost, K., 
Philipp, A. M., & Koch, I. (2010). (See References). A timely 
review of the existing task-switching literature.
Vandierendonck, A., Liefooghe, B., & Verbruggen, F. (2010). (See 
References). Another timely review that—together with the 
article by Kiesel et al.—provides a comprehensive and elaborate 
overview of the existing task-switching literature.
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Notes
1. Basically, there are two not-mutually-exclusive ways to inter-
pret switch costs. One interpretation holds that switching involves 
a voluntary act of reconfiguration, and that switch costs follow as a 
consequence of this process. The other argues that switch costs 
rather represent carryover (i.e., priming) effects from the previous 
task. Cognitive control, according to the latter view, is needed 
not so much for switching but rather for solving the conflict 
between competing tasks. This issue, however, is not the focus of 
this article.
2. Actually, in the Dreisbach, Goschke, and Haider (2006) study, we 
presented eight new transfer stimuli at the end of the experiment and 
got an unexpected result: Participants in the SR group showed no 
transfer costs, whereas those who applied the two task rules were 
significantly slower in the transfer block. However, increasing the 
number of transfer items sooner or later would certainly have led to 
a breakdown of performance in the SR group.
3. Note that this is not to say that task rules are all abstract whereas 
SR rules are all associative in nature. Especially if stimuli overlap 
between tasks, task rules can become subject to associative processes 
(e.g., Crump & Logan, 2010; Mayr & Bryck, 2005).
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